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Any exploration of art and sensuous cognition from a speculative realist perspective 
must contend with the legacy of not only Kant’s first critique 
but also his third.1 For a speculative realist aesthetics, Kant’s 
legacy is a crucial foil for two related reasons: first (and this 
is the better-explored argument), because his radically anti-
metaphysical demand “that the objects must conform to our 
cognition” is the most prominent and influential manifesta-
tion of what Quentin Meillassoux calls “correlationism” in 
After Finitude; second, and more specifically, because Kant’s 
aesthetic theory is a theory not of objects but of the human 
response to natural and artistic beauty.2 That Kant’s aesthet-
ics is as unreservedly subject-centred as his first critique 
1 The editors of this special issue would like to thank Daniel Allemann for 
diligently proofreading the whole issue and his helpful feedback on this 
introduction. Ralf Simon, Paul J. Ennis, Jon Cogburn, and Sjoerd van Tuinen 
deserve special thanks for their incisive comments on the text that follows.
2 Immanuel Kant, “Preface to the Second Edition” in Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 110. Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity 
of Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2009), 5.
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becomes immediately clear if we consider that the central 
term in the Critique of the Power of Judgement is “taste.” In 
focusing on this most crucial notion of eighteenth-century 
reflections on art, Kant joins fellow aestheticians of the age 
in bidding farewell to onto-theological theories of beauty 
revolving around notions such as harmonia, consonantia, and 
integritas to develop experientially grounded accounts of the 
production and reception of art that employ a wholly different, 
subject-centred and sensually inflected vocabulary: aesthetic 
idea, aesthetic feeling, sensuous cognition, the imagination, 
genius, the sublime, and taste.3 If Kant’s Copernican revolu-
tion and its assertion that “we can cognize of things a priori 
only what we ourselves have put into them” relegated realist 
epistemology to the margins of philosophical inquiry for 
over two centuries, his theory of aesthetic judgment likewise 
shifts our attention away from real-world objects and towards 
the subject’s experience.4 In a related vein, Kant’s notion of 
beauty is explicitly anti-metaphysical in that it locates beauty 
neither in artworks’ correspondence with a divinely ordered 
cosmos nor in objects themselves. Instead, beauty is in the 
mind of the beholder; it is something we experience: we “speak 
of the beautiful as if beauty were a property of the object and 
the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object 
through concepts of it), although it is only aesthetic and con-
tains merely a relation of the representation of the object to 
the subject.”5 More precisely, the pleasurable experience of 
beauty is an effect of the harmonious interplay of the cogni-
tive faculties of understanding and imagination.6 Finally, if 
Hartmut Böhme is correct in considering eighteenth-century 
theories of the sublime as an integral part of the Enlighten-
3 For a good account of this shift, see Monroe C. Beardsley’s classic Aesthet-
ics from Classical Greece to the Present (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 140-208.
4 Kant, “Preface,” 111.
5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), §6, 97.
6 See Paul Guyer, “Beauty and Utility in Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies (2002), 35:3, 449-50.
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ment’s project of achieving mastery over unruly nature, of 
submitting le grand dehors under human beings’ cognitive 
control, then Kant’s reflections on the dynamical sublime, a 
feeling that grows out of the subject’s pleasurable recognition 
that its reason ultimately prevails over awe-inspiring nature, 
are an integral part of that project.7 Monroe C. Beardsley puts 
it aptly: “It is our own greatness, as rational beings, that we 
celebrate and enjoy in sublimity.”8
For all these reasons, then, Kant has emerged as specula-
tive realism’s most prominent foil. Yet any attempt to think 
metaphysics and aesthetics together must contend with a 
second, equally formidable opponent, a somewhat earlier 
philosopher greatly admired by Kant: Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten. Kant based his own lectures on metaphysics on 
what was then the German-speaking world’s major treatise 
on that subject—Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (1739)—and he 
inherited Baumgarten’s understanding of aesthetic judgment 
as aesthetic (sensuous) cognition.
It was Baumgarten who coined the term “aesthetics” in his 
M.A. thesis Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema 
pertinentibus (1735).9 The brief definition he gives there, in 
§116 of his short treatise, will come as a surprise to many 
readers of these pages. In Karl Aschenbrenner and William 
B. Holther’s translation,
Therefore, things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the 
object of logic; things perceived [are to be known by the inferior faculty, 
as the object] of the science of perception, or aesthetic.10
7 Hartmut Böhme, “Das Steinerne: Anmerkungen zur Theorie des Erha-
benen aus dem Blick des ‘Menschenfremdesten’” in Das Erhabene: Zwischen 
Grenzerfahrung und Grössenwahn, ed. Christine Priess (Weinheim: VCH, Acta 
humaniora, 1989), 160-92.
8 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 219.
9 This text has been published in English translation as Reflections on Poetry/
Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, trans. Karl 
Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1954). 
10 Baumgarten, Reflections, §116, 78, original emphases. In the Latin/Greek 
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Baumgarten’s distinction between the superior faculty (reason) 
and the inferior faculty (the senses) corresponds to Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz’s successive set of differentiations between 
obscure and clear, confused and distinct, inadequate and 
adequate, and symbolic and intuitive cognition. In Leibniz’s 
scheme, in which the second term of each pair is always the 
preferred one, reason allows for clear and distinct cognition 
while the senses allow only for clear and confused cognition.11 
In Baumgarten’s account, sensory perception allows us to 
know things with clarity but intuitively and thus without the 
conceptual distinctness of reason—without, in Baumgarten’s 
words, “clarity intensified by distinction.”12 What makes 
Baumgarten’s contribution exceptional in 1735 is that he not 
only joins Leibniz in refusing to follow Descartes’ outright 
dismissal of clear but confused perception but strives to give 
sensuous cognition its rightful place within the philosophical 
system of rationalism. This comes out clearly in his better-
known definition of “aesthetics” in his two-volume Aesthetica 
(1750/58), a work that can rightly be called the foundational 
text of modern aesthetics. In Jeffrey Barnouw’s translation,
Aesthetics, as the theory of the liberal arts, lower-level epistemology 
[gnoseologia inferior], the art of thinking finely [literally, beautifully, ars 
pulchre cogitandi], and the art of the analogy of reason [i.e., the associa-
original, “Sunt ergo νοητά cognoscenda facultate superiore objectum logices; 
αισθητά, ‘επιστήης. αισθητικης sive aesheticae.” Baumgarten, Reflections, 
§116, 39.
11 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Betrachtungen über die Erkenntnis, die 
Wahrheit und die Ideen” in Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie, 
Teil 1, trans. Artur Buchenau, Philosophische Werke: in vier Bänden, ed. Ernst 
Cassirer, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1996), 9-15. Leibniz’s set of distinctions 
further refine the Cartesian differentiation between the clear and distinct 
perceptions afforded by reason and the clear but confused perceptions af-
forded by the senses. See Descartes’ famous wax example in his Meditations 
on First Philosophy, trans. Ian Johnston, ed. Andrew Bailey (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2013), 46-52. See also Ralf Simon, Die Idee der Prosa: Zur 
Ästhetikgeschichte von Baumgarten bis Hegel mit einem Schwerpunkt bei Jean 
Paul (Munich: Fink, 2013), 30-31.
12 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Ästhetik [Aesthetica], trans. Dagmar Mir-
bach, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), §617, II: 604, our translation.
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tive or natural-sign-based capacity of empirical inference common 
to man and higher animals], is the science of sensuous cognition.13
Sensuous cognition, then, belongs to lower-level epistemol-
ogy in that it depends on the inferior faculty of the senses. 
But it is structured analogous to reason, is subject to the same 
truth conditions as reason (the principle of sufficient reason 
and law of noncontradiction),14 and accounts for such a great 
variety of human experience that the philosophical tradition 
from Descartes to Christian Wolff has disparaged it at its own 
loss. In Baumgarten’s words, “A philosopher is a human being 
among human beings; as such, he is ill-advised to believe that 
such a great part of human cognition is unseemly to him.”15
Baumgarten’s valorisation of the senses and of sensuous 
cognition was daring for its time, especially for a rationalist 
philosopher. Yet it is precisely that boldness which puts him 
at odds with the speculative realist project. Baumgarten’s aes-
thetics appears as subject-centred as Kant’s: both conceptualise 
aesthetics as a question of human consciousness, be it under 
the heading of “taste” or “sensuous cognition.” As such, both 
appear to be correlationist thinkers through and through.
The remainder of this first section of our introduction ar-
gues that this is a hasty judgment. Let us begin with Kant, for 
whose aesthetics the argument has already been made, and 
then turn to Baumgarten. Recently, one of the contributors 
to our special issue has made the suggestion that it is pre-
cisely Kant’s much maligned notion of disinterestedness that 
sketches a way out of the correlationist circle as it describes 
13 Jeffrey Barnouw, “Feeling in Enlightenment Aesthetics,” Studies in Eigh-
teenth-Century Culture (1988), 18, 324; the square brackets are Barnouw’s. In 
the Latin original, “AESTHETICA (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia 
inferior, ars pulchre cogitandi, ars analogi rationis) est scientia cognitionis 
sensitivae.” Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §1, I:10.
14 See Constanze Peres, “Cognitio sensitiva: Zum Verhältnis von Empfindung 
und Reflexion in A. G. Baumgartens Begründung der Ästhetiktheorie” in 
Empfindung und Reflexion: Ein Problem des 18. Jahrhunderts, ed. Hans Körner 
et al. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1986), 31-39.
15 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §6, I:14, our translation.
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a way for human beings to relate to the real world that does 
not subject it to conceptual thought. In Without Criteria: Kant, 
Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics (2009), Steven Shaviro writes,
When I contemplate something that I consider beautiful, I am moved 
precisely by that something’s separation from me, its exemption from 
the categories I would apply to it. This is why beauty is a lure, drawing me 
out of myself and teasing me out of thought … The aesthetic subject does 
not impose its forms upon an otherwise chaotic outside world. Rather, 
this subject is itself informed by the world outside, a world that (in the 
words of Wallace Stevens) “fills the being before the mind can think.”16
Kant distinguishes between three types of pleasurable experi-
ence: that of the agreeable, that of the good, and that of the 
beautiful. Only the last of these is disinterested; only “the 
beautiful” is “an object of satisfaction without any interest.”17 
Disinterestedness here means that the experience of the 
beautiful involves neither desire for sensual gratification 
(as would Emmentaler cheese, which we may find agreeable) 
nor the satisfaction granted by the conceptual mastery of an 
object in view of its pragmatic purpose (as would a multi-
functional bike tool, which we may find good because it is 
useful).18 Shaviro notes that, unlike the judgment of the good, 
the judgment of the beautiful involves no subsumption of 
the object under a determinate concept (the concept of an 
end in our example of the bike tool). And it is for this reason 
that aesthetic experience and judgment gesture beyond the 
correlationist mantra that, in Meillassoux’s words, “we only 
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and 
being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
16 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 4-5, 12, original emphasis.
17 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §6, 96.
18 Of course, Kant distinguishes between two judgments of the good; our 
example does not cover the moral good, which is an end in itself. Our un-
derstanding of Kant’s notion of disinterestedness is indebted to Paul Guyer, 
“Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant’s Aestheticism,” The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism (1978), 36:4, 449-60.
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other.”19 This is why, in Shaviro’s reading, the Kant of the 
third critique, the Kant who proposes that “the judgment of 
taste is not a cognitive judgment (neither a theoretical nor a 
practical one), and hence it is neither grounded on concepts 
nor aimed at them,” emerges as a potential ally of specula-
tive realism.20 In our volume, it is Francis Halsall who most 
explicitly engages with the Kantian notion of the judgment 
of taste and its relevance to today’s debates within specula-
tive realist circles.
More generally speaking, quite apart from either Kant’s 
reflections on disinterested pleasure or Graham Harman’s 
provocative declaration that “aesthetics becomes first phi-
losophy,” it may be in aesthetic thinking that we should look 
for a way out of the correlationist path laid out by Kant’s first 
critique.21 It is this supposition that prompted us to solicit 
papers for a special issue on speculative realist approaches 
to aesthetics in the first place. And it is that very same sup-
position that invites us to return to the origin of aesthetics in 
Baumgarten once more. True, the Baumgartian understanding 
of aesthetics as “the science of sensuous cognition” seems to 
lead us straight down the correlationist road. But it does so 
only if we disregard the provenance of Baumgarten’s think-
ing about sense perception. Baumgarten was a philosopher 
trained in the rationalist tradition of Descartes, Leibniz, and 
Wolff. As such, he belongs to the very history of ideas in which 
Meillassoux situates his claims concerning the necessity of 
contingency: “I’m a rationalist, and reason clearly demon-
strates that you can’t demonstrate the necessity of laws: so we 
should just believe reason and accept this point: laws are not 
necessary—they are facts, and facts are contingent—they can 
change without reason.”22 And yet, as we will see, Baumgarten 
19 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 5.
20 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §5, 95.
21 Graham Harman, “On Vicarious Causation,” Collapse (2007), 2, 221.
22 Quentin Meillassoux, “Time Without Becoming,” Speculative Heresy, http://
speculativeheresy.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/3729-time_without_becom-
ing.pdf (accessed June 26, 2013).
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represents a rationalist tradition quite different from that 
evoked by Meillassoux (or Ray Brassier, for that matter).
In giving the senses their due, Baumgarten does not subscribe 
to the eighteenth-century empiricist (and thus by definition 
correlationist) creed of contemporaneous British aestheti-
cians such as Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. Instead, 
he strives to establish a science of sensuous cognition from 
within the bounds of rationalist thought. That Baumgarten’s 
aesthetics is ultimately metaphysical to the core becomes 
clearest in section xxxiv of the Aesthetica (“The Absolute 
Aesthetic Striving for Truth”). There, he writes, 
Indeed, I believe that philosophers can now see with the utmost clarity 
that whatever formal perfection inheres in cognition and logical truth 
can be attained only with a great loss of much material perfection. For 
what is this abstraction but loss? By the same token, you cannot bring 
a marble sphere out of an irregular piece of marble without losing at 
least as much material as the higher value of roundness demands.23
Four paragraphs later, Baumgarten adds a remarkable ob-
servation:
Above all, the aesthetic horizon delights in those particular objects that 
exhibit the greatest material perfection of aestheticological truth, in 
the individuals and the most specific of objects. These are its woods, 
its chaos, its matter [sua silva, Chao et materia] out of which it chisels 
the aesthetic truth into a form that is not entirely perfect yet beautiful, 
always in the attempt to lose as little materially perfect truth as possible 
and rub off as little of it for the sake of tastefulness.24
Baumgarten has a remarkably strong notion of truth, which 
we have learned to distrust in the wake of Nietzsche and his 
post-structuralist heirs (on potential Nietzschean ramifica-
tions for speculative realism, see Theodor Leiber and Kirsten 
Voigt’s contribution to this volume). As we will see in the second 
23 Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §560, I:538, our translation.
24 Ibid., §564, I:542, our translation.
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section of this introduction, it took Alain Badiou to return 
aesthetics to the question of truth. For Baumgarten, sensuous 
cognition allows us to glimpse something of that which reason’s 
striving for abstraction and formal perfection denies us: the 
richness, multiplicity, plenitude, and particularity of things, 
the “woods,” “chaos” and “matter” of the real world.25 More 
precisely, not only sensuous but all cognition is ultimately 
based on what Baumgarten calls “fundus animae” (the dark 
ground of the soul), which is a repository for infinitesimally 
small pre-conscious, unconscious, and half-conscious sensu-
ous perceptions (Leibniz’s petites perceptions) that ensures the 
soul’s continuing activity even when we sleep and mirrors the 
plenitude of the universe.26 For Baumgarten, neither reason 
nor the senses can ever fully access the infinite universe, but 
the aestheticological truth of artworks approaches that ideal in 
that it gives form to the material perfection of things in their 
multiplicity and particularity: “Aestheticological truth brings 
the light of beauty into the fundus animae by working a beauti-
ful form out of the chaotic woods.”27 In his contribution to our 
25 See Peres, “Cognitio sensitiva,” 36.
26 Baumgarten puts it thus in the Metaphysica: “There are dark perceptions in 
the soul. Their totality is called GROUND OF THE SOUL [FUNDUS ANIMAE].” 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metaphysica, 7th, rpt. ed. (Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms Verlag, 1963), §511, 176, our translation. For good discussions of the 
fundus animae and its relation to Leibniz’s petites perceptions, see Hans Adler, 
“Fundus Animae—Der Grund der Seele: Zur Gnoseologie des Dunklen in der 
Aufklärung,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesge-
schichte (1988), 62:2, 197-220; Peres, “Cognitio sensitiva,” 39-40; Tanehisa 
Otabe, “Der Begriff der ‘petites perceptions’ von Leibniz als Grundlage für 
die Entstehung der Ästhetik,” JTLA (2010), 35, 46-49; and Simon, Die Idee 
der Prosa, 26-46. Note also that while the fundus animae seems akin to what 
Freud would later call “the unconscious,” Simon rightly insists that the two 
are categorically distinct (27-28).
27 Ralf Simon, Die Idee der Prosa, 50, our translation. Note that the resulting 
artwork is not just form; it is beautiful form because it manages to retain 
something of the plenitude of things instead of reducing them to the ster-
ile formulae of scholasticism (which Baumgarten disparages in §53 of the 
Aesthetica). See Baumgarten, Aesthetica, §§557-58, I:534-36; §§562-65, I:540-44. 
In Wolfgang Welsch’s words in “Ästhetische Grundzüge im gegenwärtigen 
Denken” in Grenzgänge der Ästhetik (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1996), 81: “Aesthet-
ics—which Baumgarten introduced as a Trojan horse into the fortress of the 
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volume, Sjoerd van Tuinen taps into this rationalist tradition 
to argue that artworks themselves can be speculative. Yet not 
even the aestheticological truth of art can capture the truth of 
the world in its totality; Baumgarten “liberates himself from 
the idea of total access, from the ideal of complete cognition 
and thus also from the traditional obsession with absolute 
assurance and certainty.”28 In this model, only God is able to 
cognise things simultaneously in their formal and material 
perfection; only he possesses metaphysical truth. Ultimately, 
then, Baumgarten turns out to be a rationalist quite different 
from Meillassoux: Baumgarten, too, aims at the real, but he 
does not presume that the absolute can be recuperated. In-
stead, he stresses human finitude, i.e., our ultimate inability 
to access the real. For that reason, even though Baumgarten 
is clearly no empiricist in its eighteenth-century sense, his 
thinking has the closest affinities not with Meillassoux’s work 
but with those speculative realists we describe as—rather 
unusual—empiricists in the third section of this introduc-
tion (Harman, Shaviro, Iain Hamilton Grant, Tim Morton). 
Baumgarten’s framing of aesthetics as a theory of experience, 
sensation, and sensuous cognition lays the ground for their 
expansion of aesthetic thinking into the non-human world.
Not unlike Kantian disinterested pleasure, sensuous cogni-
tion allows us to experience the real in its confused beauty 
rather than subjecting it to conceptual thought. Perhaps, it 
is in sensuous cognition and aesthetic experience that “in-
tuitions without concepts” are not “blind” after all.29 If, from 
the perspective of what N. Katherine Hayles in this issue 
calls the argumentative, philosophical variety of speculative 
aesthetics (an aesthetic theory born out of the spirit of specu-
lative realism), one of the thorniest questions concerning 
sciences—brings about a change in the concepts of science and cognition: 
henceforth, genuine cognition is aestheticological cognition, and genuine 
science cannot ignore its aesthetic determinants” (our translation).
28 Steffen W. Gross, “Felix Aestheticus und Animal Symbolicum: Alexander G. 
Baumgarten—die ‘vierte Quelle’ der Philosophie Ernst Cassirers?” Deutsche 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2001), 49:2, 285, our translation.
29 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 193-94.
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aesthetics is that of human access to the real, then both Kant’s 
and Baumgarten’s inquiries into forms of access that are not 
primarily conceptual in nature at the very least allow us to 
imagine non-correlationist ways of relating to the universe 
of things. For a speculative realism that does not follow Meil-
lassoux in trying to reclaim the absolute on purely rational 
grounds this is a crucial, though underexplored legacy. 
But let us not jump too quickly from eighteenth-century 
aesthetics to the new metaphysicians. As the following sec-
tion shows, the speculative realists are not alone among 
contemporary thinkers in returning to the original meaning 
of aesthetics as a theory of modalities of perception.30
Contemporary French and German Aesthetics
Aesthetic matters have generally witnessed a strong return 
in philosophy and other disciplines of the humanities in the 
last fifteen years.31 In this section, we briefly survey some of 
the influential positions in contemporary aesthetics in order 
to establish what it means to pursue aesthetics in the twenty-
first century and how these contemporary discourses in turn 
contribute to understanding the content, aims, and possible 
limits of speculative aesthetics. 
Let us begin with two thinkers whose work has been greatly 
responsible for the present resurgence of aesthetics in phi-
losophy, art history and criticism, media and literary studies: 
Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière.
In the Handbook of Inaesthetics, Alain Badiou claims that 
what we lack today is a proper understanding of the relation 
between art, philosophy, and truth. In his view, three schemata 
have so far determined our understanding of this relation. 
30 For a similar assessment, see Ernst von Glasersfeld, “Farewell to Objectiv-
ity,” Systems Research (1996), 13:3, 279-86.
31 See John J. Joughin and Simon Malpas, eds., The New Aestheticism (Man-
chester: Manchester University Press, 1996); Isobel Armstrong, The Radical 
Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Jonathan Loesberg, A Return to Aesthet-
ics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Thomas Docherty, Aesthetic 
Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
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He terms these schemata the “didactic,” the “classical,” and 
the “romantic.” The didactic and the classical schemata have 
their origin in Greek philosophy, in Plato and Aristotle, while 
the third schema, as its name implies, was established in the 
Romantic age.32 According to the didactic schema, art produces 
a “semblance” of truth while truth is in fact “external to art” 
and only conceivable in philosophy. In the romantic schema, 
“art alone is capable of truth,” a truth that philosophy can only 
approximate. And in the classical schema, there is no truth 
to art at all—art is only cathartic, and “not at all cognitive or 
revelatory.”33
Badiou holds that the major schools of thought of the 
twentieth century were but continuations of these schemata: 
Marxism was a continuation of the didactic schema—we see 
this in the work of Brecht, for whom art makes manifest an 
external, philosophical truth, that of “dialectical materialism”; 
German hermeneutics was a continuation of the romantic 
schema—we see this in the work of Heidegger, where only 
the poet truly “maintains the effaced guarding of the Open,” 
meaning only art discloses the truth that philosophy can at 
best proclaim or register; and psychoanalysis was a continua-
tion of the classical schema—we see this in the work of Freud 
and Lacan, for whom art is mainly therapeutic and has no 
claim to truth outside of the “imaginary.”34
Crucially, Badiou holds that the twentieth-century continu-
ations of the inherited schemata led to a “saturation of these 
doctrines.” The major schools of thought in the twentieth 
century, while unable to establish a new schema for the rela-
tionship between art, philosophy, and truth, have all reached 
certain—political, quasi-theological, institutional—dead ends, 
ultimately relinquishing any claim to truth on the part of art. 
Badiou suggests that this is due to the fact that none of these 
schools of thought established a notion of artistic truth that 
32 Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, trans. Alberto Toscano (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 1-5.
33 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 2-4, original emphasis.
34 Ibid., 5-7.
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is proper to art itself. In his words, they missed out on articu-
lating a notion of artistic truth that is both “immanent” and 
“singular”—a truth that is manifest in art and, in the particular 
form in which it is manifest, only in art.35
In the didactic schema, the truth of art is singular yet not 
immanent: singular because art is a semblance and because 
semblance is unique to art; yet not immanent because truth 
ultimately belongs to philosophy. In the romantic schema, 
the truth of art is immanent yet not singular: immanent be-
cause art (and only art) makes truth manifest; yet not singular 
because this is a truth that philosophy also aspires to. In the 
classical schema, the truth of art is neither singular nor im-
manent: art is merely therapeutic, without any claims to truth 
whatsoever. Yet only through a singular and immanent notion 
of artistic truth can we find a way out of the dead ends of the 
predominant aesthetic discourses of the twentieth century.36
Badiou holds that we can only arrive at such a notion if we 
give up the idea that the work of art is “the pertinent unity of 
what is called ‘art.’”37 Any notion of artistic truth that proceeds 
from the work of art as the bearer of that truth must neces-
sarily fall back into the aporiae of the established schemata. 
Rather, Badiou suggests, we have to comprehend the pertinent 
unity of art as an
Artistic configuration initiated by an evental rupture … This configura-
tion, which is a generic multiple, possesses neither a proper name nor 
a proper contour, not even a possible totalization in terms of a single 
predicate. It cannot be exhausted, only imperfectly described. It is an 
artistic truth, and everybody knows that there is no truth of truth.38
Badiou’s evental notion of artistic truth cannot be exhaus-
tively discussed here.39 Yet what we can grasp from this brief 
35 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 7-9, original emphases.
36 See Ibid., 9.
37 Ibid., 10. 
38 Ibid., 12.
39 For a more extensive discussion of Badiou’s inaesthetics and his evental 
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account is that Badiou perceives the major aesthetic discourses 
of the twentieth century to have reached certain historical 
limits, which in his view is based on their failure to properly 
comprehend the truth of art, that is, to establish a notion of 
artistic truth that is both singular and immanent, according 
to which art is “irreducible to philosophy,”40 and in which 
philosophical aesthetics becomes an “inaesthetics,” a think-
ing about art that “makes no claim to turn art into an object 
for philosophy.”41 And in order to achieve such a notion of 
artistic truth, we must first consider what we talk about when 
we talk about art: the author, the work, the recipient, or, as 
Badiou suggests, an event? 
In the Handbook of Inaesthetics, Badiou returns to an issue 
that centrally concerned Baumgarten at the inauguration 
of aesthetics as a discipline—the relation between art, truth, 
and philosophy. How does Baumgarten’s notion of this re-
lation fare in the schemata of Badiou? Baumgarten seems 
to firmly remain within their limits, yet a clear assignment 
of his notion of artistic truth to one of the schemata seems 
quite difficult. As stated earlier, aestheticological truth has 
the advantage over the truth procedures of reason that it 
provides us with a material, concrete kind of truth that reason 
alone—because of its necessary abstraction—cannot deliver. 
This might suggest that we are dealing with an immanent 
yet not singular kind of truth here, i.e., with the romantic 
schema: art (the aestheticological truth procedure) aspires to 
the same kind of truth that philosophy (the truth procedure 
of reason) does, but whereas philosophy’s truths are purely 
formal, art retains something of the plenitude of the universe 
in giving form to matter and thereby presenting a perhaps 
even more comprehensive form of truth. Yet one could also 
argue that this more material form of truth is in fact merely 
complementary: while art does bring forth a special kind of 
notion of artistic truth, see Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 193-208.
40 Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 9.
41 Ibid., epigraph.
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truth, this kind of truth, because it is not strictly based in the 
procedures of reason, remains subordinated to philosophi-
cal truth—Baumgarten is a rationalist after all. This would 
then suggest the didactic schema: art is singular in that it 
produces a concrete, material kind of truth, yet truth in its 
highest form is not immanent to art, but only to philosophy. 
The exact position of Baumgarten in the schemata of Ba-
diou appears ultimately undecidable—it oscillates between 
the romantic and the didactic—but what is clear is that he 
certainly does not present a notion of artistic truth which is 
both singular and immanent, i.e., a kind of truth which in 
Badiou’s view would do justice to a contemporary aesthetics 
that manages to overcome the dead ends of the major schools 
of thought of the twentieth century. 
Since Badiou’s schemata shed light on both the historical 
and the contemporary landscapes of aesthetics, relating 
speculative realism to them should prove illuminating with 
respect to its position vis-à-vis other contemporary currents. 
Given that speculative realism does not denote a unified 
doctrine, such juxtaposition should also shed some light on 
internal differences within the movement. This is a thread 
we will take up again in the third and last section of our essay. 
For now, let us continue with our brief and selective survey 
of contemporary positions by turning to another prominent 
French thinker: Jacques Rancière.
Whereas Badiou’s work invites us to think about the rela-
tion between art, philosophy, and truth, with Jacques Rancière 
we are given the opportunity to address matters of politics 
and aesthetics. Arguably, the relation between politics and 
aesthetics is one of the central issues of Rancière’s oeuvre. 
For the purpose of our brief survey, we will focus on Ran-
cière’s The Politics of Aesthetics—a book that nicely sums up 
his aesthetico-political project.
One obvious way to think about the relation between aesthet-
ics and politics would be to think about the avant-garde, yet 
Rancière holds that “avant-garde thinking” has today turned 
into a form of “nostalgia”—a form of thought that only still 
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claims the utopian in its absence.42 This is best perceived in 
the work of Jean-François Lyotard, in which art becomes “wit-
ness to an encounter with the unrepresentable that cripples 
all thought” as a means to accuse or prevent the “arrogance 
of the grand aesthetic-political endeavour to have ‘thought’ 
become ‘world’”—an endeavour that has become ideologi-
cally dubious, and must hence be rejected, which means for 
art to reject thought, or rather, to present that which cannot 
be attained by thought.43 This however renders such an avant-
garde thinking politically powerless.
Rancière’s aim is not to proclaim, once more, “the avant-
garde vocation of art or … the vitality of modernity that 
links the conquests of artistic innovation to the victories of 
emancipation.”44 Rather, he wants to develop a basic terminology 
by which we can properly understand the particular relation 
of aesthetics and politics. In order to achieve this, Rancière 
holds that we must first acquire a clearer conception of the 
term aesthetics.45 Crucially, Rancière suggests that aesthetics 
must not be understood in its more narrow definition, as the 
philosophy of art, but more broadly and fundamentally, “in a 
Kantian sense … as the system of a priori forms determining 
what presents itself to experience.”46 Aesthetics in this sense 
is concerned with what Rancière famously calls “the distri-
bution of the sensible”: “the system of self-evident facts of 
sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence 
of something in common and the delimitations that define 
the respective parts and positions within it.”47 
Rancière returns here to the very origins of aesthetics—
and not only Kant’s notion of aesthetics, but also to that of 
42 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London: 
Continuum 2004), 9.
43 Ibid., 10.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 13.
47 Ibid., 12.
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Baumgarten as the science of perception. Yet Rancière gives 
this notion an emphatic political twist that both Kant and 
Baumgarten lack. With Rancière, a pleasurable experience 
can never be disinterested, but is always already interested, 
shaped by and in turn shaping the distribution of the sensible 
in pre-discursive—because it pertains to the very basic acts 
of perception—ways; likewise, whatever is formed out of the 
plenitude of the universe strives not after an absolute truth, 
but an ideological one: the aesthetic is not metaphysical, but 
political. 
Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics presents a fundamental 
rethinking of the relation between politics and aesthetics, 
which is, crucially, based on a general redetermination of 
what aesthetics is concerned with: not just with art practices, 
but more fundamentally with modes of sense perception. 
Only through such a return to the origins of aesthetics can 
we finally understand the political import of artistic prac-
tices. Rancière’s point is that at its very core, the aesthetic 
act is political: sense perception is always an act that is itself 
structured and structures that which is perceived, granting 
the visibility of some objects and rendering others invisible 
(which affirms the power of some social groups at the cost 
of others), promoting some genres of art and disqualifying 
others. Aesthetics means the distribution of the sensible. 
This very claim—that aesthetics cannot be separated from 
politics, but is, at its core, entwined with it—is a particularly 
interesting one to consider with regard to speculative real-
ist thought. Like Rancière, some of the representatives of 
speculative realism also return to the origins of aesthetics as 
the science of perception and sensuous cognition in order 
to newly determine its basic character and thereby general 
import for philosophy and adjacent disciplines. Yet whereas 
this redetermination in Rancière suggests that the aesthetic 
is essentially political, in speculative realism it leads to a 
marginalisation, if not erasure, of the political. Of course, 
the basic non-human approach of speculative aesthetics 
might necessitate this: in its establishment of an aesthetics 
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that goes beyond the human scope of things and addresses 
relations of objects regardless of our investment in them, 
the political—arguably an essentially human realm—gets 
dropped from its list of concerns.
Such an assessment of aesthetics after the speculative turn 
might make one assume that it is an apolitical project that at-
tempts to re-establish a newly purified aesthetics, which from 
a partisan position would render it potentially problematic 
on ideological terms. Yet such an assumption would be quite 
short-sighted. For even though the non-human aims of specu-
lative aesthetics disengage it at its core from any political 
relations, this must not mean that political issues might not 
re-enter the discussion. It might even be that precisely such 
a program might help us gain a new understanding of how 
political action takes place, which is what one of our contribu-
tors, Thomas Gokey, suggests. Gokey’s essay is interesting 
for a further reason, because he conceives the speculative 
possibilities of political action in terms of an avant-garde 
practice—precisely the practice that is declared obsolete by 
both Rancière and Badiou.48 Furthermore, the fact that Har-
man in his essay engages with the question of what the next 
avant-garde might look like solidifies our assumption that 
a speculative aesthetics might pose not just one but several 
challenges to other popular aesthetic discourses of our time. 
We will now move from France to Germany for our last 
discussion of a contemporary position, and consider the 
recent developments in aesthetics there. Very helpful in this 
respect is the collection of essays titled Falsche Gegensätze: 
Zeitgenössische Positionen zur philosophischen Ästhetik. This 
book brings together essays by some of the major figures in 
contemporary German aesthetics—Andrea Kern, Jens Kulen-
kampff, Christoph Menke, Martin Seel, Ruth Sonderegger, and 
48 See Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics, 9-10. Badiou holds that the avant-
garde, despite its attempt of being a proper twentieth-century aesthetic, did 
not manage to overcome the obsolete schemata, but rather formed a com-
bination of two of them: the avant-garde was “didactico-romantic.” Badiou, 
Handbook of Inaesthetics, 8.
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Albrecht Wellmer—and in the editors’ introduction contains 
a concise statement of their common pursuit.
The basic gesture of recent German aesthetics is similar to 
that of Badiou and Rancière: it presents a fundamental chal-
lenge to some of the persistent premises of modern aesthetic 
theory. In this, it is specifically concerned with the relation 
of aesthetics to theoretical and practical philosophy (accord-
ing to the modern division of philosophy). As Andrea Kern 
and Ruth Sonderegger claim in their introduction to Falsche 
Gegensätze, we are confronted today with two problematic 
understandings of this relation.
The first understanding claims that aesthetics assesses a 
kind of experience which is autonomous and therefore stands 
in no relation whatsoever to a “theoretical and practical 
experience of the world,” because to argue that there is such 
a relation would undermine the distinctiveness of aesthetic 
experience and thereby also of the discipline of aesthetics. 
The authors hold that such a view implies a “marginalisation” 
of aesthetic experience for our everyday life, and of aesthet-
ics for philosophy. Aesthetic experience thus at best ends up 
being just a form of “relief from the ordinary, a diversion, a 
distraction.”49 
The second understanding assesses the relation between 
aesthetic, theoretical, and practical experience in a diametri-
cally opposed way. Here, aesthetic experience is no longer 
conceived as autonomous, “irreducible to the ordinary expe-
rience of the world,” but conversely represents “the highest 
form of precisely those experiences that theoretical and prac-
tical philosophy also want to comprehend.” For in aesthetic 
experience, the world appears to us “in the whole fullness 
and variety of possible interests and purposes,” rather than 
being approached under particular aspects, as in practical 
or theoretical philosophy. Such an understanding however 
implies that aesthetics, which assesses this experience, is no 
49 Andrea Kern and Ruth Sonderegger, “Einleitung” in Falsche Gegensätze: 
Zeitgenössische Positionen zur philosophischen Ästhetik, ed. Andrea Kern and 
Ruth Sonderegger (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2002), 7-8; this and all sub-
sequent translations are ours.
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longer just one of the major disciplines of philosophy, but 
rather attains the status of “the only true philosophy.”50 
The main problem that Kern and Sonderegger perceive here 
is that these positions are often assumed to be “mutually ex-
clusive”—that it seems impossible to conceive of an aesthetic 
experience which is both autonomous and informative for 
our everyday lives and the other domains of philosophy. Yet 
this is the view that the contributors to Falsche Gegensätze 
want to establish. Even more emphatically, they argue that 
“precisely through the particular way by which it is related to 
ordinary, everyday experience,” aesthetic experience “turns 
into an autonomous one.”51 
Kern and Sonderegger suggest three central concepts for 
determining this particular relation of aesthetic experience 
to other experiences: “reflection, aporiae, and play.” The terms 
themselves already suggest why aesthetic experience is not 
congruent with ordinary experience—not because it has 
no relation to it at all, but because it “relates itself to it” in a 
special way—reflectively, aporetically, playfully. The authors 
hold that this is a crucial point, for it implies that there is a 
close link between aesthetic experience and the basic gesture 
of philosophy itself: in philosophy, as in aesthetic experience, 
“we relate ourselves … to our relation to the world.”52
Such a reconception of aesthetic experience leads to a 
fundamental redefinition of the position aesthetics takes 
among the other domains of philosophy: aesthetics is no 
longer either marginal nor of the highest significance to 
practical and theoretical philosophy, but now instead stands 
in a “reciprocal relation” to them. Yet the status of aesthetics 
does remain special. Because of the philosophical character of 
aesthetic experience, aesthetics transcends the status of being 
merely one of the major disciplines in philosophy, but rather 
becomes the discipline for the contemplation of philosophy: 
in its reflection of aesthetic experience, aesthetics “cannot 
50 Kern and Sonderegger, “Einleitung,” 8-9, original emphasis.
51 Ibid., 9-10.
52 Ibid., 10, our emphasis in second quote, original emphasis in third quote.
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forbear to reflect the relation of its subject to philosophy and 
with that to reflect philosophy itself.”53
We register here a further attempt to fundamentally rene-
gotiate some of the central terms of traditional aesthetics, in 
this case the relation of aesthetics to practical and theoretical 
philosophy. Importantly, the contributors to Falsche Gegensätze 
put forward not only that we need a new understanding of 
this relation, but also that such a new understanding might 
imply that the discipline of aesthetics claims a special status 
inside philosophy. Such a diagnosis is reminiscent of Har-
man’s already quoted assertion that aesthetics become “first 
philosophy.” Yet Kern and Sonderegger’s assessment is of a 
markedly different character: whereas in Harman’s program, 
aesthetics becomes metaphysics, in Kern and Sonderegger it 
attains a metaphilosophical status.
Summing up our survey of recent French and German 
contributions to aesthetics and their relation to speculative 
realist concerns, we can say that one of the fundamental 
gestures of contemporary aesthetics, by which it attempts to 
reinvigorate debates about art, is to reconnect such debates 
to the original concerns of the discipline—to the questions 
of sensation, sense perception, and sensuous cognition that 
already occupied Baumgarten and, subsequently, Kant. Con-
necting again these two divisions of aesthetics—the philoso-
phy of art and the science of sensuous cognition—seems to 
be one distinctive characteristic of the current writings on 
aesthetics that creates new valences and yields prolific new 
ways by which to renegotiate both the relation of aesthetics 
to the other domains of philosophy and the more specific 
matters of aesthetics itself. It comes as no surprise, then, that 
several of the contributions to this issue straddle this divi-
sion as they ask some of the most fundamental questions 
about aesthetics and sensuous cognition even as they engage 
with specific works of art: Roberto Simanowski on digital 
art, Magdalena Wisniowska on Samuel Beckett’s television 
53 Kern and Sonderegger, “Einleitung,” 10-11, original emphasis.
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plays, van Tuinen on mannerist painting, Robert Jackson on 
the modernist legacy in contemporary video and sculpture 
work, Harman, Bettina Funcke, and Gokey on avant-garde art. 
Together with Halsall’s reflections on Kant’s third critique, 
these essays make up the second part of our volume, “The 
Theory of Art,” where we bring together those texts that en-
gage most directly with artistic concerns.
Where precisely contemporary reformulations of aesthet-
ics should lead us is a matter of dispute, and the various ap-
proaches apparent in aesthetics today vary greatly in terms 
of their specific aims. Yet they all seem to share something 
in their pursuits, namely that they all attempt to re-establish 
the aesthetic in its distinctiveness. This means to establish the 
aesthetic as something specific, as in Badiou’s claim that art 
has its own proper truth that is irreducible to other discourses 
and can never be appropriated by them (which consequently 
turns any truthful philosophy of art into an inaesthetics); 
and also as something of special importance, as in Rancière’s 
suggestion that politics is always (also) grounded in aesthetics, 
and in Kern and Sonderegger’s claim that aesthetics is the 
exceptional discipline of philosophy in which philosophy 
and its other disciplines can be reflected.
Like the other contemporary aesthetic discourses, speculative 
aesthetics also lays claim to the distinctiveness of the aesthetic, 
putting forward equally programmatic statements about the 
particularity of its status precisely by bringing together matters 
of sensation with matters of art, which consequently enables 
an extensive re-evaluation of the proper matters of aesthetics, 
which, as in Claire Colebrook’s contribution to our volume, 
might very well turn out to be the inherent aestheticism of 
matter itself. The first part of our issue, entitled “The Art of 
Theory,” assembles these more programmatic interventions 
featuring, besides Colebrook’s essay, the contributions of 
Shaviro, Leiber and Voigt, Matija Jelača, Hayles, Jon Cogburn 
and Mark Allan Ohm, and Miguel Penas López. 
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Aesthetics and Speculative Realism
Having traced the historical origins and, by means of paradig-
matic examples, the contemporary landscape of the discipline 
of aesthetics and the attendant problems and questions it 
grapples with, we will now try to determine the place of the 
recent speculative turn in continental philosophy within this 
field.54 In order to do so, both historically and systematically, 
let us first return to the beginnings of aesthetics and its early 
eighteenth-century prehistory in the discourse on taste. 
In his entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James 
54 Of the original four speculative realists, Graham Harman has undoubtedly 
been the most explicit advocate of aesthetics. His claim that aesthetics has 
to be viewed as first philosophy and his theory of allure are well known by 
now. In addition to the already mentioned “Vicarious Causation” see also 
his “Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-Human,” Naked 
Punch (2007), 9, 21-30 and particularly his Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenol-
ogy and the Carpentry of Things (Chicago: Open Court, 2005), 101-44. Quentin 
Meillassoux in turn has recently given us his reading of Mallarmé’s Coup 
de dés in Quentin Meillassoux, The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of 
Mallarmé’s Coup de Dés, trans. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2012). 
And while Iain Hamilton Grant has not explicitly written on aesthetics per se 
yet, given his Deleuzo-Schellingian dynamic process philosophy, it is safe to 
say that aesthetics plays a crucial role in his metaphysical project. One need 
only remember that Schelling pronounced “aesthetic intuition” as “merely 
transcendental intuition become objective” and art thus consequently “at 
once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy” (F. W. J. 
Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: 
The University Press of Virginia, 1978), 231), and that for Deleuze aesthetics 
is the “apodictic discipline” (Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. 
Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), 68). From the original four, only 
Ray Brassier has voiced his disdain for aesthetics (“Against an Aesthetics of 
Noise,” Transitzone, nY, http://ny-web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.
html (accessed September 18, 2013)). To these four thinkers, one should add 
Steven Shaviro and Reza Negarestani, the latter engaging aesthetic form 
directly by means of theory fiction. See Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria 
and Reza Negarestani, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials 
(Melbourne: Re.press, 2008). In addition, Timothy Morton just published his 
Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 
2013) that takes up Harman’s philosophy in order to develop an aesthetic 
account of causality. Finally, one should mention Armen Avanessian’s project 
of a speculative poetics and the book series related to this project: Spekula-
tive Poetik, http://www.spekulative-poetik.de/ (accessed September 18, 2013).
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Shelley emphasises the antagonistic stance theories of taste 
adopt vis-à-vis rationalist theories of beauty. He describes 
the situation thus:
Rationalism about beauty is the view that judgments of beauty are 
judgments of reason, i.e., that we judge things to be beautiful by rea-
soning it out, where reasoning it out typically involves inferring from 
principles or applying concepts … It was against this … that mainly 
British philosophers working mainly within an empiricist framework 
began to develop theories of taste. The fundamental idea behind any 
such theory—which we may call the immediacy thesis—is that judgments 
of beauty are not (or at least not primarily) mediated by inferences 
from principles or applications of concepts, but rather have all the 
immediacy of straightforwardly sensory judgments; it is the idea, in 
other words, that we do not reason to the conclusion that things are 
beautiful, but rather “taste” that they are.55
In this vein, if one were to paint a broad-brush picture of 
speculative realism, one could maintain that what we are wit-
nessing today, what is discernible now that the very first wave 
of the speculative turn has hit the shore and the ripples have 
subsided, is a new struggle between rationalism and empiri-
cism within contemporary speculative philosophy in general 
and its take on aesthetics in particular. In fact, aesthetics is 
the domain that brings to light precisely this divide. Devoting 
a special issue to speculative realism and aesthetics thus not 
only provides an opportunity to survey what the speculative 
turn in all its variety might bring to the discourse on aesthetics, 
but comes with the added value of sharpening the focus on 
this variety itself. In analogy to Shelley’s account, one could 
thus say that for the contemporary rationalists, mathematics 
(Meillassoux) and science (Brassier) dictate the discourse 
on and the place of aesthetics within the larger framework 
of epistemology with the concomitant intent to hunt down 
any manifestation of the, in their view, illusory “immediacy 
55 James Shelley, “The Concept of the Aesthetic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/
entries/aesthetic-concept/ (accessed September 23, 2013), original emphasis.
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thesis.” The empiricists (Harman and Grant, but also Shaviro 
and Morton) in turn insist upon “immediacy” and a theory of 
taste in disguise holding that we immediately taste something 
before we conceptually know it. Brassier voiced this divide 
within speculative realism precisely along these lines in a 
2009 interview, where he said that he is 
Very wary of “aesthetics”: the term is contaminated by notions of 
“experience” that I find deeply problematic. I have no philosophy of 
art worth speaking of. This is not to dismiss art’s relevance for philoso-
phy—far from it—but merely to express reservations about the kind of 
philosophical aestheticism which seems to want to hold up “aesthetic 
experience” as a new sort of cognitive paradigm wherein the Modern 
(post-Cartesian) “rift” between knowing and feeling would be overcome 
… Some recent philosophers have evinced an interest in subjectless 
experiences; I am rather more interested in experience-less subjects.56
This passage indeed seems to suggest that aesthetics is the 
domain where the differences among the speculative realists 
are most acutely on display. In addition, Brassier’s juxtaposi-
tion highlights the inverse importance accorded to experience 
(empiricism) on the one hand and the subject (rationalism) on 
the other, thus confirming our labelling of the two opposing 
camps as empiricists and rationalists respectively. Resuming 
our genealogical recovery of the empiricist notion of taste from 
a contemporary point of view, let us emphasise that we spoke 
of a theory of taste in disguise since this traditional expres-
sion is barely ever mentioned in the respective speculative 
realist writings.57 Furthermore, these theories of taste would 
56 Brassier, “Against an Aesthetics of Noise,” n.pag.
57 Morton, while not discussing it in detail, does refer to it in passing several 
times in his latest monograph. Morton, Realist Magic, 77, 89, 131, 168, 201. 
Shaviro in turn discusses taste more extensively, particularly throughout 
the first chapter of his Without Criteria. Shaviro, Without Criteria, 1-16. Both 
treat taste in the context of Kant’s analytic of the beautiful precisely, as al-
ready indicated in our first section, because 1) Kantian judgments of taste 
are not regulated by concepts, and 2) because Kantian judgments of taste are 
disinterested. This moment in the discourse on taste is attractive to these 
thinkers because it seems to offer a potential entryway to things as they are, 
that is, reality itself.
Introduction
31
have to be de-humanised as they apply to the fabric of reality 
as such, not just the realm of the human faculty of judgment. 
It becomes clearer what we are trying to say if we complement 
taste with intuition, sensation, and perception (as it actually 
happened in the history of aesthetics itself, as Baumgarten’s 
aesthetics qua sensuous cognition followed on the heels of 
early British reflections on taste).58 Thus, in Harman’s (and 
Morton’s) object-oriented framework, aesthetics, as manifested 
in the theory of allure, refers to one object tasting, intuiting, 
sensing, perceiving another object; in Grant’s Schellingian 
transcendental naturalism, aesthetics concerns the tasting, 
the intuition of nature’s forces and potencies; and in Sha-
viro’s Whiteheadian cosmology, which he further develops 
in his contribution to this volume, it adequately describes 
the domain of prehension, that is, the domain of relational-
ity per se. For all these thinkers, any encounter whatsoever 
is always the site of aesthetic experience (and the emphasis 
rests on both of these terms equally). In these philosophies, 
aesthetics is other to conceptual knowledge, and prior to it. 
Given the expansion of aesthetics into the non-human realm, 
this is also the moment when aesthetics is pushed from the 
domain of human epistemology into that of general ontol-
ogy. Ceasing to be a particular kind of human relation to the 
world, it becomes a general descriptor of relationality of/in59 
the world. As López argues in his contribution to this volume, 
Gilbert Simondon’s relational ontology has ventured into 
this terrain half a century before the speculative realists. It 
is in exploring that same space, albeit under the banner of a 
substance ontology, that Harman has ventured to call aesthet-
58 One would have to mention Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, The Spectator, 
with Notes, and a General Index, 2 vols. (New York: Printed by Samuel Marks, 
1826), Anthony Ashley Cooper (Third Earl of Shaftesbury), Characteristics of 
Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), and Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Origin of 
Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 2004), all of which were published between 1711 and 1725 and thus 
well before Baumgarten coined the term “aesthetics” in 1735.
59 The choice of the preposition depends on whether one favours a relational 
ontology (of) or a substance ontology (in).
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ics first philosophy: in this framework, human epistemology 
only builds on and comes after the general aesthetic structure 
of/in being. Indeed, “subjectless experience” underlies and 
comes to determine cognising subjects.
It is this centrality of aesthetic experience that the rationalists 
dispute. They view such a hypostatisation of aesthetic experi-
ence beyond the human realm as illegitimate and unfounded. 
Why use terms such as perception or intuition for describing 
non-human relations? According to the rationalists, this not 
only confuses a very human trait for a trait of reality in gen-
eral; much worse, it actually impedes and hinders the rational 
inquiry into human and non-human relations, just as Jelača 
argues in staging a face-off between Sellars and Deleuze in 
his contribution. Thus, for the rationalists, epistemology qua 
rational inquiry governs and determines aesthetics. By their 
lights, any immediate “tasting” of anything is but a human 
fiction. Consequently, they do not have much to say in this 
regard, as Brassier himself makes unmistakably clear in the 
passage quoted above. All they have to offer for this discourse 
is to call it out for its “irrationalism.”
Our neat dichotomy of rationalists vs. empiricists is too neat, 
though, and needs to be complicated. After all, the advent of 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy separates this older debate 
from everything that came afterwards. Nothing remained 
the same after Kant’s invention of the transcendental. His 
Copernican revolution marks the decisive turning point in 
the history of modern philosophy as it intervenes precisely 
in this debate between rationalism and empiricism. It is in this 
context that Meillassoux’s diagnosis of correlationism, a di-
agnosis all speculative realists agree on, needs to be located. 
As Paul J. Ennis has convincingly shown,60 the charge of 
correlationism is precisely directed against transcendental 
philosophy.61 Thus, we have to add transcendental philosophy 
60 Paul J. Ennis, Continental Realism (Winchester: Zero, 2010).
61 This is also the reason why Meillassoux has ventured to propose the term 
subjectalism as a complement to the earlier correlationism in one of his 
recent essays, Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A 
Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless Sign,” http://oursecretblog.com/
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to the mix. What we are witnessing in speculative realism is 
to a large extent a reworking of the transcendental. What all 
of the speculative realists retain from the Kantian invention 
of the transcendental is its immanence.62 All speculative real-
ists are firmly concerned with this world and their respective 
philosophies are thisworldly. What they all reject is Kant’s 
Copernican revolution, which Meillassoux in After Finitude 
denounced as a “Ptolemaic counter-revolution.”63 What is 
rejected is thus the centrality of human experience and its 
conditions of possibility. However, while one part of speculative 
realism particularly rejects the human in human experience, 
the other side rejects precisely the experience. On the one side, 
what results is an ontological recasting of the transcendental 
as it applies to reality per se: a transcendental empiricism 
(Grant, Harman, Morton, Shaviro); on the other side, we have 
an epistemological account of the powers of human thought 
to pierce this very same reality: a transcendental rational-
ism (Brassier, Meillassoux). As such, both of these strains of 
thought are to a certain extent already present in Kant. This 
is why Kant, harking back to the very beginning of this article, 
is both speculative realism’s worst enemy and best friend.
With respect to aesthetics, we could also recast this divide 
in terms of Badiou’s tripartite division discussed above. In 
this vein, the transcendental empiricist camp of speculative 
txt/QMpaperApr12.pdf (accessed October 24, 2013). A revised version is 
forthcoming in Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity since 
Structuralism, ed. Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik (London: Bloomsbury, 
2015). The neologism serves to recuperate and subsume within his sweep-
ing critique both idealist and vitalist philosophies whose point of origin 
Meillassoux ultimately traces to the pre-transcendental idealism of Berkeley.
62 Already Gilles Deleuze acknowledged and emphasised this point in his 
own critique of Kant: “Kant is the one who discovers the prodigious domain 
of the transcendental. He is the analogue of a great explorer—not of another 
world, but of the upper or lower reaches of this one.” Gilles Deleuze, Difference 
and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004), 171.
63 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 119. It is perhaps worth noting that this is not 
Meillassoux’s coinage and has been in use at least since Bertrand Russell’s 
original publication of Human Knowledge in 1948. See Bertrand Russell, Hu-
man Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London: Routledge, 2009), 1. Of course, 
discussions of Kant’s “revolution” date to even earlier.
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realism would be engaged in a radical reworking of the Ba-
diouian romantic schema, while the transcendental rationalist 
camp could be said to either propose a renewal of the clas-
sical schema or a development of Badiou’s own inaesthetics. 
The lack of publications that explicitly take up aesthetics 
makes it difficult to assess Brassier and Meillassoux on this 
point. Risking a judgment, it seems to us that Brassier could 
be said to endorse the classical schema, while Meillassoux 
seems to be more in line with Badiou. Admittedly, we are on 
very thin ice here. These diagnoses are based on Brassier’s 
rejection of the category of experience on the one hand, and 
Meillassoux’s following remarks from “Iteration, Reiteration, 
Repetition” on the other:
My materialism is so far from being hostile to empiricism, that in fact 
it aims to found the absolute necessity of the latter. My only disagree-
ment with the empiricist is that I affirm that he [sic] is absolutely correct: 
If you want to know or think what is, you must necessarily (from my 
point of view) do so by way of a certain regime of experience: scientific 
experimentation (the sciences of nature), historical and sociological 
experience, but also literary and artistic experience, etc. And here, my 
role is to prevent a certain philosophical regime from contesting the 
sovereignty of those “disciplines of experience” I have enumerated.64
Meillassoux, like Badiou, defends the disciplines’ autonomy 
both from one another and from philosophy. As a result, it 
seems to us that Meillassoux should be sympathetic to Ba-
diou’s inaesthetics project. Also, note that while Meillassoux 
thus carves out a space of truth pertaining to art, this space 
remains purely empirical—it is given (“what is”) and thus a 
manifestation of facticity. Meillassoux, however, is interested 
in founding the absolute necessity of the contingency of such 
facts—the “speculative essence” or “factiality” of facticity 
which itself is not a fact.65 This is why Meillassoux is not 
an empiricist. It is also the reason why he is not that much 
64 Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition,” 12, original emphases.
65 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 79.
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interested in art.66 He is happy to leave discussions about art 
to the experts in the respective “disciplines of experience,” 
that is, aesthetics and theory of art. 
This is consistent with the fact that Meillassoux just pub-
lished an extensive reading of Mallarmé’s Coup de dés: the 
truth of the poem is intrinsic to literary (or artistic) practice, 
but this intrinsic truth it produces is indicative of another, 
philosophical, truth—and this is where Meillassoux’s interest 
lies. According to Meillassoux, Badiou reads the uncertainty 
and hesitation in Mallarmé’s poem as congruous with his 
own notion of the event. In this vein, the word “perhaps” as 
employed in the poem points to a future to come, “awaiting a 
truth that would come to complete it in the same time as abol-
ish it, replacing its hypotheticity with an effective certitude.”67 
Meillassoux thinks that this leads to “devaluing or relativizing 
the interest of [Mallarmé’s] poetry” as it integrates and cuts 
down to size the function of the “perhaps,” which, accord-
ing to Meillassoux’s own reading, lies in its hypostatisation: 
the absolutisation of chance.68 Such diagnosis, of course, is 
not very far from Meillassoux’s “necessity of contingency” 
thesis—hence his interest in Coup de dés.69 In the context of 
66 The same holds true of Meillassoux’s relation to the sciences—this goes 
a long way towards explaining the lack of actual scientific discourse in 
After Finitude despite its initial appeal to the sciences in its discussion of 
the arche-fossil.
67 Quentin Meillassoux, “Badiou and Mallarmé: The Event and the Perhaps,” 
trans. Alley Edlebi, Parrhesia (2013), 16, 38.
68 Ibid., 38.
69 How the aesthetic is to be situated in relation to contingency in Meil-
lassoux’s overall philosophical system is hinted at in the excerpts from 
L’inexistence divine included in Harman’s study of Meillassoux. There, Meil-
lassoux employs the notion of beauty as the indicator of the justness of a 
possible future world of justice and thus, in Kantian fashion, inextricably ties 
the aesthetic to the moral. Where in Kant the experience of beauty parades 
the world before our eyes “as if [it] had been created in conformance with 
… moral ends” and thus opens up the possibility of God, in Meillassoux, as-
suming that a perfect just world were incarnate at some future point in time, 
it would—in accordance with his principle of unreason and the necessity 
of contingency—reveal “the emergence without reason of an accord between 
reason and the real.” The experience of beauty would thus be an indicator 
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our discussion, what is remarkable in Meillassoux’s account 
is that he castigates Badiou for not being faithful enough 
to the truth of the poem, that is, for failing to live up to his 
own inaesthetics. Meillassoux then proceeds to out-Badiou 
Badiou himself. 
A similar picture to that drawn from Badiou’s tripartite 
classification of aesthetic discourse emerges from Kern and 
Sonderegger’s introductory survey. When Kern and Sondereg-
ger contest both the notion that aesthetics is the “only true 
philosophy” and the idea that it is but philosophy’s servant,70 
they reject the romantic and classical schemata of art. In turn, 
their recasting of aesthetics as metaphilosophical could pos-
sibly even be seen as a reworking of the didactic schema as 
aesthetics thus provides philosophy with the mirror to observe 
itself as it is engaged in its epistemic project.71 If we take these 
recent trends into account, it seems that Badiou’s diagnosis 
of the death of the three aesthetic schemata is ill-fated as all 
three seem to be well and alive. A Badiouian might of course 
maintain that these strands are helplessly lost as they are 
caught in their dead ends and that only a proper inaesthetics 
provides the royal road of escape. Whatever the repercus-
sions, it seems to be clear that speculative realism is divided 
between a retrieval (in the Harmanian sense elaborated in 
his contribution to this issue) of romantic aesthetics and its 
complete dismissal (Brassier); or, minimally, a profuse lack 
of interest towards it (Meillassoux). 
of the contingency of justice incarnate, and only a world that offers this 
experience would be a just world. Quentin Meillassoux, “Excerpts from 
L’inexistence divine,” trans. Graham Harman in Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy 
in the Making by Graham Harman (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2011), 218-19, original emphasis.
70 Kern and Sonderegger, “Einleitung,” 8-9.
71 It is telling that Kern and Sonderegger do not have a word to say about 
ontology and only evoke ethics (practical philosophy as concerned with the 
good) and epistemology (theoretical philosophy as concerned with truth) 
as the other central disciplines of philosophy besides aesthetics. Equating 
theoretical philosophy with epistemology, their understanding of philosophy 
is very much in line with twentieth century’s anti-metaphysical outlook. 
Philosophy is indeed reduced to an epistemic project.
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The speculative realist retrieval of romantic aesthetics as 
expounded by its transcendental empiricist wing also goes a 
long way towards explaining the lack of an explicit discourse 
on politics. A short juxtaposition with Rancière’s position 
should prove illuminating in this respect. From the point of 
view of the speculative realist retrieval of romanticism, Ran-
cière’s socio-political notion of the distribution of the sensible 
has to be recast in metaphysical terms. It is due to speculative 
realism’s larger metaphysical outlook that aesthetics becomes 
divorced from the political; or, rather, the political becomes 
just one tiny field within being where the aesthetic plays out 
and politics can thus not assume a central role in its deter-
mination. Against advocates of a politics of being who argue 
for an inherently political structure of being and thus might 
object to such an argument, we agree with the speculative 
realists that politics needs some rudimentary form of polis 
to take place, and a mere congeries of things—what object-
oriented thinkers call Latour Litanies—does not make a polis. 
Thus, distribution has to be recast as a neutral ontological, not 
partial socio-political activity (or occurrence; or process—pick 
your favourite term). 
With this observation, we have reached the end of our short 
foray into the historical and systematic ramifications of the 
contemporary aesthetic landscape. As a means to conclude 
this survey, let us return once more to the heyday of aesthetics 
that started with Kant and continued through all of German 
Idealism. We have stated that speculative realism in large parts 
amounts to a retrieval of just this tradition, an argument that 
Cogburn and Ohm present in much more detail in their Whig 
history of speculative realism, which serves to introduce their 
own concerns with truth and fiction in their contribution to 
this special issue. In this vein, aesthetics in the twenty-first 
century, at least in its speculative guise, amounts to either a 
radical reworking of German Idealism (the speculative realist 
transcendental empiricists) or it amounts to nothing much at 
all (the speculative realist transcendental rationalists). Strik-
ingly, the latter position comes close to Jens Kulenkampff’s 
diagnosis in his contribution to Falsche Gegensätze. Having 
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dismissed both Kant’s and Hegel’s metaphysical commitments 
as obsolete, Kulenkampff closes his essay with the following 
provocative remark:
European aesthetics before Kant is in truth but a prehistory to philo-
sophical aesthetics, and philosophical aesthetics from Hegel onwards 
is nothing but a variant of either Kantian or Hegelian aesthetics. If, 
however, Kant and Hegel are no longer available as reference figures 
for a philosophical aesthetics, then aesthetics might indeed survive as a 
sub-discipline within academic philosophy, and the label “Philosophi-
cal Aesthetics” continue to exist, but a philosophical aesthetics worthy 
of the name is long dead.72
Contra Kulenkampff (and contra the transcendental rationalist 
wing of speculative realism), however, speculative realism’s 
transcendental empiricists testify to the ongoing relevance 
of the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition as can be witnessed 
in their central reworking of the transcendental and the im-
portance of figures such as Schelling and Kant himself. Let 
us be clear on this point, then, and state it as succinctly as 
possible: speculative aesthetics in the twenty-first century is 
German Idealism redux.
72 Jens Kulenkampff, “Metaphysik und Ästhetik: Kant zum Beispiel” in 
Falsche Gegensätze, 80, our translation.
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